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In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, (i.e., first-
generation, born in Lebanon) resided abroad. Meanwhile, in early 
2016, it was said that “Lebanon hosts approximately 1.1 million 
refugees from Syria which amounts to around one in five people in 
the country”,1 or “one in four” according to other estimates.2 However, 
and notwithstanding the large scale of population movements to and 
from Lebanon throughout the country’s history, these figures are at 
best, educated guesses: the size and structure of Lebanon’s resident 
population (as well as that of the Lebanese population) remain “an 
enigma”.3 For example, at the time of writing, late 2016, the UN 
population data estimated the total population in Lebanon to stand 
at 5,988,000,4 while Lebanon’s Central Administration for Statistics’ 
homepage was displaying gave 3,759,100, for 2007!5 
The reasons for this lack of data is primarily political.6 The Lebanese 
political system distributes political functions according to sectarian 
affiliation.7 Therefore, the numbers (hence, definitions) of the 
Lebanese resident population, of Lebanese expatriates, of foreign 
citizens qualifying for Lebanese citizenship, etc. are all fraught with 
huge political implications: they would affect the country’s sectarian 
structure, hence, sect-based power-sharing arrangements. For 
example, the size of the Lebanese diaspora is usually estimated at 
between four and thirteen million.8 This is because the actual holders of 
Lebanese nationality only make up a fraction of the descendants of the 
Lebanese migrants, who left the territory under Ottoman rule, before 
1920 (the creation of Lebanon) or 1924 (the Lausanne Treaty of 1924 
that is the basis for the definition of Lebanese citizenship). However, 
the criteria applied for selecting those qualifying for the Lebanese 
citizenship, among all foreign citizens of Lebanese descent worldwide 
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has always been controversial among Lebanon’s various 
political actors. The potential size of the Diaspora has 
been so controversial as it might upset the sectarian 
structure of the population, hence tilting the balance of 
power.9 Therefore, while “the norm of transmission of 
nationality is patrilinear affiliation, naturalisation [was] 
almost always subject to the discretionary power of the 
State”, and ultimately depended on sectarian, clientelist 
or financial interests.10 In a similar manner, the numbers 
and sectarian profiles of foreign residents, the rights they 
should, or should not, be entitled to, and their access 
to citizenship, are extremely delicate in political terms. 
The politics of number explain why Lebanon has not 
organised any population census since the one conducted 
in 1932, which defined the numerical domination of 
Christians (and among them the Christian Maronites) 
over Muslims.11 Later, “the Ta’ef Accord enshrined in the 
Constitution the confessional basis of power sharing in 
the Lebanese state.”12 Consequently, the production of 
population data, has relied on extrapolations from earlier 
data and on sample surveys, the validity of which cannot 
be fully assessed.13  
Emigration14 from the Mount Lebanon region started 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, in the period of 
Ottoman domination.15 Early Lebanese migrants headed 
mainly to the USA, Mexico, and to Latin American 
countries, and often performed commercial activities 
there. At the end of the Great War, it was estimated that 
a third of the Mount Lebanon population had emigrated. 
After a slowdown in the 1930s, emigration from Lebanon 
resumed following the Second World War. Previous 
migration destination diversified. Migrants now also 
went to Australia, New Zealand, France and West 
African countries. Migration to the Arab Gulf States also 
intensified in the late 1950s and after the Six-Days War in 
1967, as growing political instability was acting as a push 
factor and skilled workers were increasingly needed in the 
Gulf states. However, the waves of Lebanese emigrants 
who left Lebanon to go to the USA, to Australia and to 
Canada before the 1980s, were predominantly composed 
of low-skilled workers. Migration chains, organised 
and sustained on the basis of kinship and sectarian ties, 
characterised Lebanese migration flows and destination 
patterns, with high geographical concentrations in 
specific world regions.16 Migration chains allowed 
Lebanese migrants to overcome the progressive closure 
of receiving countries to Lebanese or to low-skilled 
immigrants.17
The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1989 
compelled some 990,000 people, or 40 percent of the total 
population,18 to flee the country. The various phases of the 
armed conflict, as well as the destruction of the economy, 
of infrastructure and housing and ensuing high rates of 
unemployment, poverty and health deprivation, spurred 
emigration. These migrants came from all sectors of the 
population, relying on networks previously established 
in various parts of the world. However, Australia 
and Canada set up special programmes that allowed 
Lebanese migrants to obtain visas to these countries on 
humanitarian grounds. The new migrants who arrived 
in the late 1970s in Australia, for instance, were low-
educated and poor rural villagers from North Lebanon. 
Their socio-cultural and professional insertion in the host 
country proved difficult.19 In the late 1970s, Germany 
and Scandinavian countries also became destinations 
for Lebanese migrants who had no qualifications and 
no migration networks. These organised humanitarian 
migration channels mostly benefitted Palestinians20 
and populations in South Lebanon,21 following the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the “war of the 
camps” between 1985 and 1988. However, the refugees 
faced obstacles in accessing education and professional 
insertion in these host states, and even encampments.22 
Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Lebanese 
emigrants have been increasingly skilled and educated, 
especially those who emigrated to Western countries and 
the Gulf States. Young generations benefitted from the 
generalization of higher education in Lebanon: in 2009–
2010, UNESCO data indicated that above 50 per cent of 
Lebanese 18–23 year olds were enrolled in the forty-one 
universities operating in the country in 2015,23 a record 
high in the Arab world. Yet, the concentration of economic 
activities in the tertiary sector (trading, tourism, banking 
and finance); the increasing commitments to neo-liberal 
economic policies since 1990, which concentrated 
opportunities in low productivity, low-paid sectors; the 
high prevalence of informal employment; and, above all, 
the limited size of Lebanon’s labour market compelled 
many tertiary-educated to leave the country for job 
opportunities.24 Economic and political clientelism, and 
the widespread corruption plaguing the country,25 also 
prevented many from finding rewarding employment 
opportunities in Lebanon. 
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Meanwhile, South Lebanon had become the main 
migrant-sending region in Lebanon in the early 2000s,26 
due to a combination of demographic expansion in 
the region and political tensions.27 Indeed, since 1990, 
Lebanon has experienced a Syrian military presence,28 in 
addition to periods of political instability punctuated by 
several political assassinations and civil strife. Lebanon 
also witnessed increased confrontations with Israel, 
culminating in the war of July 2006, which pushed many 
young Lebanese men and women to emigrate, in addition 
to deterring them from returning after the conflict 
ended.29 Since then, regional political developments30 
are said to have affected Lebanese migration patterns, 
especially to the Gulf.31 Two-hundred Lebanese families 
were deported from Saudi Arabia in February 2016,32 
and several waves of Lebanese expatriates have also been 
expelled from the UAE since 2009, some having been 
accused of sympathy with Hezbollah.33 Although no 
official reason was given by the UAE for the deportation 
of Lebanese families; most of those affected were Shiites, 
and were accused of carrying out “illegitimate activities in 
the Gulf nation.”34 These obstacles to Lebanese emigration 
to GCC countries, added to the negative consequences of 
the economic recession in the oil-producing States, may 
deepen socio-political tensions in the country. The war 
in Syria and the presence of one million or more refugees 
was also said to have intensified emigration pressure on 
all sectors of the Lebanese population.35
Emigration clearly has a structural role in Lebanon’s 
economy and politics, and political leaders praise the role 
of the diaspora in their rhetoric (“Lebanon, a bird with 
two wings”).36 However, it is worth noting that Lebanon’s 
successive governments since 1990 have not set up strong 
policies aiming at strengthening ties with the Lebanese 
diaspora,37 beyond creating a Ministry of Emigrants 
in 1994.38 Only recently did the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Emigrants launch an array of initiatives, 
such as organizing yearly national Diaspora conferences, 
mostly to attract expatriates’ investments.39 Yet, so far, 
the channeling of investments to the country, and local 
development actions have been left to private initiative 
and to confession-based, transnational networks,40 
in addition to UN-sponsored initiatives such as Live 
Lebanon UNDP.41 
Furthermore, after the enactment of the 2008 
Parliamentary Elections Law, which guaranteed the right 
to vote while residing abroad for Lebanese expatriates, 
the Lebanese Government has been engaging with the 
Diaspora and encouraging them to register and vote in 
the 2013 elections.42 These elections did not, in the end, 
take place. However, the issue of expatriates voting from 
abroad for the next legislative elections, scheduled for May 
2017, is a point of controversy among Lebanon’s political 
actors. Proposed reforms to the current electoral system 
are hotly debated,43 and some also call for allocating 
seats to representatives of the diaspora.44 Whether the 
new voting system becomes proportional, or hybrid with 
provisions from the proportional and winner-takes-all 
systems, or if the current disputed majority system 
is kept, the political consequences of incorporating 
expatriates into the electorate would indeed differ. The 
sectarian distribution of Lebanese abroad, and/or their 
political leaning, may affect the current distribution of 
political functions.45
Lebanon is a major migrant-receiving country too. 
Labour migration to the country is, in theory, strictly 
controlled. Foreign labourers must be sponsored by a 
resident in Lebanon to receive residency. The sponsor/
employer applies for the labour permit and must pay fees; 
the profession has also to be opened to non-Lebanese 
(cf. below, on Palestinian refugees). Since 1990, the 
country has received growing numbers of Asian, African 
and other Arab workers, predominantly Syrian. Syrian 
workers were estimated to number around 400,000 
before the onset of the war in March 2011. Most of these 
Arab and non-Arab workers operate in the informal 
sector, without labour permits, in the agricultural and 
construction sector, as well as in domestic and cleaning 
services; many women are to be found in these last two. 
The dire conditions and abuses endured by many of 
these workers, especially female domestic workers, have 
led to awareness campaigns by several Lebanese NGOs 
and there has been particularly controversy over the 
sponsorship system.46
Lebanon is no party to the Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 1951 or its 1967 Protocol and has not 
adopted any domestic legislation addressing the status of 
refugees. Refugee status is at present determined mainly 
by the provisions of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) signed between Lebanon and the UNHCR in 
2003. Attempts have been made to renegotiate the terms 
of the MoU in recent years, with no success to date.47 
Besides the Armenian refugees who arrived in Lebanon 
in 1918, 1922 and 1939,48 an estimated 130,000 refugees 
from Palestine arrived in Lebanon after 1948,49 of whom 
105,000 were registered with UNRWA in 1951.50 About 
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400,000 refugees were registered with UNRWA in 2010; 
however, a survey conducted that year estimated that 
the number of Palestinian refugees effectively residing 
in the country was only 260,000 to 280,000.51 Given the 
Lebanese context, the issue of Palestinian resettlement 
in the country has remained the most controversial 
point of the refugee debate: granting citizenship to 
Palestinians, who are mostly Sunni Muslims, would 
upset the delicate sectarian and political-demographic 
balance in Lebanon. Economic competition with 
Lebanese workers is also a potential problem: the rise of 
unemployment levels among the Lebanese themselves 
would also stoke discontent, with the preferential hiring 
of cheap Palestinian labourers. This would compel more 
Lebanese citizens to emigrate and further skew the 
sectarian structure of the country.52 Therefore, Lebanon’s 
official stance was always to defend the Palestinians’ 
right of return, in line with UN resolution 194.53 More 
discriminatory policies were applied soon after Ta’ef. On 
15 December 1995, the Labour Ministry issued decree 
621/1. This decree, in addition to the more than seventy 
jobs banned since 1962,54 added another forty-six salaried 
jobs and independent professions that Palestinians could 
not participate in. The text of the decree also stressed 
how the principle of national preference should be 
employed in all professions. In 2001, Parliament passed a 
law prohibiting Palestinians from owning, or from selling 
and bequeathing property, a right that they had had for 
decades; Palestinians were also confined to UNRWA and 
private health and education facilities. Yet, debates on 
the issue of tawtin (resettlement) may slowly incorporate 
“the Palestinians into the mould of the Lebanese 
sectarian system”.55 In 2005, Lebanon partly lifted the 
ban on Palestinians holding most clerical and technical 
positions, provided that they obtain a temporary work 
permit from the Labour Ministry; the consequences of 
this new opportunity were, however, limited.56 On 19 
August 2008, the Lebanese authorities and the Palestine 
Liberation organization (PLO) finally agreed to give 
temporary ID cards to non-ID Palestinian refugees. 
Non-Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suffer a similarly 
precarious status in the country, due to Lebanon’s 
“no-asylum policy”. The MoU signed between Lebanon 
and the UNHCR, in 2003, grants only limited guarantees 
to refugees recognised by UNHCR. It guarantees none 
to the ones who arrived before 2003, or who were 
rejected by UNHCR. These become de facto irregular, 
undocumented residents, facing imprisonment, if taken 
in.57 Around 10,000 Iraqi refugees were registered in 
Lebanon between 2003 and 2011; yet, tens of thousands 
more are believed to reside in Lebanon, unrecorded.58 
Syrian refugees benefitted from Lebanon’s open door 
policy towards Syrians until January 2015. Unlike Jordan 
and Turkey, Lebanon did not open camps for the refugees, 
who settled in urban and rural host communities. The 
Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), which makes 
up the Lebanon chapter of the Regional Refugee and 
Resilience Plan (3RP), is co-managed by the United 
Nations and the Government of Lebanon, represented 
by the Minister of Social Affairs. The latter, together 
with several local and international NGOs, implements 
the assistance schemes. Arrivals to Lebanon grew at a 
prolonged pace through 2013 and 2014, with 47,000 
refugees on average being registered by UNHCR per 
month.59 The influx of Syrians into Lebanon has resulted 
in economic, political, social and religious tensions in 
the country. Curfews have been put into place in some 
cities and villages in the name of public safety,60 following 
attacks on police and members of the military by Syrian 
religious extremists. Many Lebanese fear that the Syrian 
Civil War will spill into Lebanon, especially after radical 
Syrian Sunni Islamist factions executed Lebanese soldiers 
in August 2014 as part of the battle of Arsal.61 
The Lebanese government eventually took steps to 
limit access to Lebanon. Palestinian refugees from Syria 
had been first denied entry62 and were also targeted by 
deportations following a change of policy in May 2014.63 
In October 2014, the government finally announced that 
it would limit entries of Syrians to “extreme humanitarian 
cases”: single women fleeing with their children, those 
needing urgent medical care and children separated from 
their families. Since then, Lebanon has turned away as 
many as 60 percent of people attempting to cross the border, 
according to the Red Cross.64 Moreover, Syrian refugees 
are prohibited from re-entering the country if they go 
back for a visit to Syria, one of the several new entry and 
exit regulations applied since 2014.65 New residency rules 
were also introduced in January 2015. Syrian nationals 
were barred from entering Lebanon unless falling under 
specific and defined categories of limited duration visas: 
“tourism”, “work”, “shopping”, “transit”, etc. A visa for the 
“displaced” could only be issued, but “under exceptional 
circumstances to be finalized by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs”. Those failing to fit any of the pre-set categories 
were required to be sponsored by a Lebanese citizen. To 
renew their legal residency in Lebanon, refugees were 
instructed to pay $200 for each family member above 15 
5 ■ Migration Profile: Lebanon
years of age. Additional certificates, such as a certified 
housing commitment, notarised pledges not to work 
and proof of financial means, were added to the list of 
necessary documents.66 These are often impossible to 
produce and are making renewal of legal residency 
increasingly difficult for refugees. In May 2015, the 
Lebanese government instructed UNHCR to suspend the 
registration of Syrian refugees in the country altogether.67 
The residency renewal fees were eventually waived 
in February 2017. Yet, the waiver only concerned the 
refugees registered with UNHCR before January 1, 2015, 
and those who obtained residency through their UNHCR 
certificate at least once in 2015 or 2016. The waiver thus 
excludes Syrians not registered with UNHCR, estimated 
to be around 483,000 persons,68 registered refugees 
who renewed their residency through sponsorship by a 
Lebanese national, as well as Palestinian refugees from 
Syria.69
In 2012, refugee students gained access to public schools. 
The Education Ministry subsequently added a second 
shift to enable more children to attend. Yet, as of 2015-
2016, only 157,984 refugee children (from KG to grade 
nine) were enrolled in formal public education, while 
over 472,000 Syrian refugee children between the ages 
of 3 and 17 were registered with UNHCR in Lebanon.70 
Syrian refugees are seeing deteriorating conditions in 
Lebanon. With their savings depleted, and with few or 
no employment opportunities, more than 70 percent 
now live below the national poverty line of $4 a day,71 
an increase from 49 percent in 2014. Moreover, due to 
lack of funds, the World Food Program had to lower its 
monthly food tokens from $30 to $13 per person, per 
month in July 2015.72
At the same time, a World Bank report suggested that 
Lebanon’s GDP growth is projected to remain sluggish 
through 2016 due partly to the Syrian crisis.73 This is 
in spite of a boom in Syrian investments and economic 
input since 2011, which boosted demand, increased bank 
deposits and added 36 million US$ to the economy paid by 
refugees to the Lebanese property owners every month.74 
As of March 2016, the World Bank support for Lebanon 
consisted of fifteen active projects representing a total 
commitment of $900 million. These projects cover several 
sectors, including education, social protection, health, 
urban development, transport, water, environment, 
finance, the private sector and social services.75 Of the US$ 
4.7 billion requested for January to December 2017 in the 
2017-2018 3RP, US$ 2 billion were pledged for Lebanon. 
Meanwhile, the EU has designated Lebanon as one of 
its six “priority countries” for migration management 
and development projects. In November 2016, the EU 
and Lebanon adopted the partnership priorities for the 
coming four years, as well as a compact, whose objective 
is to improve the living conditions both of refugees 
temporarily staying in Lebanon and of vulnerable host 
communities. The EU-Lebanon compact foresees an EU 
allocation of a minimum of €400 million in 2016-2017, 
in addition to the bilateral assistance of more than €80 
million for those two years. In turn Lebanon commits to 
easing the temporary stay of Syrian refugees, especially 
regarding their residency status.76
Yet, for Syrian and Palestinian refugees, the future is 
bleak. The Lebanese government has repeatedly stressed 
that Lebanon is neither a country of asylum, nor a country 
of resettlement. In mid-September 2016, the then-
Labour Minister Sejaan Azzi announced a plan to ship 
refugees back to Syria over a two-year period starting in 
January, while Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam 
defended a similar plan at the United Nations Summit on 
Refugees and Migrants in New York.77 In a speech after 
his election, President Aoun also addressed the issue of 
Syrian war refugees, saying that no “solution should be 
made in Syria that does not include” their return from 
Lebanon.78 This discourse echoes similar discourses, as 
well as policy-shifts in Turkey and in Jordan. Since 2015, 
the three-major refugee-receiving countries in the region 
increasingly felt a sharp contrast on the ground. They 
were hosting the bulk of the refugees from Syria, yet 
this contrasted with Europe’s at best, tepid response to 
accommodating refugees.79
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OUTWARD MIGRATION
Stock
In 2014, an estimated 885,000 Lebanese migrants, 
(i.e., first-generation, born in Lebanon) were residing 
abroad. Lebanese nationals stand out among other 
Arabs, for the scale of their worldwide emigration: 41 
per cent migrated to the Gulf States, especially Saudi 
Arabia and in the UAE; 23 per cent were in North 
America and 21 per cent in Europe (Table 1). Lebanese 
communities have also been established in Australia 
(92,000 Lebanese migrants), in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as in West Africa.
INWARD MIGRATION
Stock
Estimating the total population of Lebanon is, as 
explained in the introduction, a challenge. The 2007 
figure of 3,759,100 residents was estimated to have 
grown to around 4.2 million in 2015, based on different 
surveys.104 The figure includes Lebanese, as well as 
foreign residents and workers. It excludes Palestinians 
and other refugees, as well as Syrian refugees who have 
arrived since the outbreak of the war in 2011.
Syrians make up 98 percent of the refugees and persons 
in refugee-like situation placed under the responsibility 
of UNHCR is Lebanon (Table 2).
Registered Syrians numbered 1,017,433 in September 
2016. Females slightly outnumbered males (52 percent 
in total), 27 percent were younger than 18 and 43 percent 
were in the 18-59 age category. The average number 
of persons per household was 4.2. However, survey 
figures show that Syrian households may reach 10 to 
15 members in case of extended family displacement. 
Because of Lebanon’s “no camp” policy, Syrian refugees 
are scattered in more than 1700 localities across the 
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Between 2005 and 2014, 31,483 Lebanese citizens were 
naturalized in the US and 20,423 in Canada. About 
43,000 Lebanese were also naturalized in European 
countries during the same period, of whom 68 percent 
were in France and Germany. In that country, about 
half of resident Lebanese migrants were recorded as 
German citizens as of 2015. This indicates that Lebanese 
nationals were granted better access to German 
nationality than other foreign nationals.80 
Lebanese expatriates in the Gulf have a relatively 
balanced sex ratio: 114 males for 100 females (53 
percent of males) in Kuwait in December 2012, for 
instance.81 Of the 42,586 Lebanese residing in Kuwait 
that year, 44 percent were workers and 55 percent 
were family dependents. Women make up a sizeable 
share of Lebanese workers in Kuwait in 2012 (25 
percent).82 However, the high proportion of family 
dependents among Lebanese expatriates there also 
indicates that these are mostly highly-skilled: the level 
of income and skills, indeed, determines the right to 
family reunion in Gulf countries. These nationals, 
then, occupy professions in the upper income bracket, 
which offer the best possibilities for family reunion.83 
Witness accounts, for example, stated that “35% of the 
directorship positions in the Gulf countries are occupied 
by Lebanese” in the late 2000s.84 A survey conducted 
in 2013 on Lebanese migrants in the region85 also 
confirmed the assertion: the overwhelming majority of 
interviewees were found to be involved in managerial 
as well as in professional occupations, mostly in the 
‘business and administration’ field of both categories.86 
Most interviewees were employed in the ‘Financial and 
insurance’ and in the ‘Information and communication’ 
sectors. The ‘Construction’ (for men) and ‘Human 
health and social work’ sector (for women) came next.87
The socio-demographic profile of Lebanese migrants in 
other destination countries is much more diverse than 
in the Gulf. Most Lebanese migrants in OECD countries 
are males (56 percent) and 86 percent are in working 
age groups (15 to 65 years and 43 percent in the 25 to 44 
age category). Yet, Australia and the US, as well as, to a 
lesser extent, Canada and France, host older age groups: 
between a third (in Australia) and a quarter (in France 
and in Canada) of the Lebanon-born, there, are 55 and 
above, and 16 percent are in the 65 and above age group 
in the US and in Australia. Child migrants (aged below 
15) are rare everywhere. This indicates that Lebanese 
family migration is uncommon,88 except, to a certain 
country where they live in apartments, collective 
shelters, tented settlements, unfinished houses, garages, 
warehouses and worksites. At the beginning of the 
conflict, while wealthy Syrians settled in Beirut, most 
initially came to the Northern region of Lebanon, 
especially Wadi Khaled and Tripoli where cross-border 
ties with Syria were strong. Syrian families seeking 
shelter from the later battles in Homs, Quseir, Zabadani 
and Hama progressively settled in the Beqaa region.105 
These two locations are said to host increasing number 
of Syrians who cannot afford the more expensive central 
region and towns.
It is difficult to know how many of these registered 
refugees from Syria were in Lebanon before 2011, 
since before the outbreak of the war, Lebanon was 
a major destination for Syrian labourers, working 
primarily in construction, agriculture and other 
low-skilled activities. Their number was estimated 
to stand at between 300,000 and 400,000 in 2011.106 
It is, therefore, likely that the one-million registered 
refugees from Syria includes some former labourers 
who found themselves unable to return to Syria after 
the outbreak of the war, and consequently brought their 
family into Lebanon. These newcomers registered as 
refugees with UNHCR upon arrival, while pre-2011 
residents remained unrecorded. As a matter of fact, as 
of June 2013, government figures for Syrian nationals in 
Lebanon gave 500,000 Syrians registered with UNHCR 
and waiting registration; 300,000 migrants; 200,000 
“unregistered” and over 54,500 Palestinian refugees 
from Syria (PRS).107 In 2016, the Lebanese government 
widely used the figure of 1.5 million Syrian refugees 
in the country.108 As no comprehensive, country-wide 
counting is available to sort all categories of migrants 
(labourers, refugees, undocumented resident, etc.), it 
is difficult to assess the figure and to conclude whether 
the estimates of registered refugees from Syria actually 
incorporate the Syrian resident population as a whole, 
or if some have remained in administrative limbo. 
The new rules imposed on Syrians by the Lebanese 
authorities since January 2015, and the suspension of 
the registration of new refugees from Syria forced on 
UNHCR by the Lebanese government in May 2015 
have been forcing increasing numbers of refugees into 
a clandestine life. These are refugees unable to renew 
their residencies due to the high fees due (200 US$ per 
adult aged 15 and above), as well as newcomers who 
have not been able to access UNHCR or other support. 
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extent, in Canada where 5 percent of all migrants are 
children. The age structure of Lebanese migrants in 
North America, Australia and France, added to the 
relatively balanced sex ratio there, is indicative of well-
established migrant communities. Yet one that is still 
attractive to new, young and middle-aged professionals, 
to students as well as, to a lesser extent, to families. In 
France, for example, the diversity of Lebanese migrants’ 
profiles was reflected in their residency patterns: as of 
December 2015, 33 percent of Lebanese residents were 
holding family-related permits, 22 percent education-
related residencies; 16 percent were in “remunerated 
activities” and 29 percent held other types of permits, 
including some for “residence only”. 89 Among 
newcomers (those granted first permits), students made 
up 65 percent of all permit holders. This suggests that 
tertiary education is the main entryway into France: 
next comes joining the labour market and founding a 
family.90
Also noteworthy is the predominance of the age group 
25-44 among Lebanese nationals in the other subset 
of countries: this age category makes up 59 percent of 
all migrants in Germany, 57 percent in Sweden and 
Denmark, and 52 percent in the UK. The profile of 
Lebanese migrants in Northern Europe is less diverse 
than that for North America, Australia and France: as 
of December 2015, half of the Lebanese residents in 
Germany held a family-related residency permit, while 
44 percent of them held a permit for humanitarian 
Table 2 also indicated that non-Syrian registered 
refugees and other persons of concern numbered only 
23,264 on 31 December 2015.109 Among these, Iraqis 
made up the largest group with 7,234 refugees and 
9,929 asylum-seekers. Yet, it is estimated that Lebanon 
also hosted “several thousands” of unregistered Iraqis, 
most of whom suffer from great legal and socio-
economic precarity.110 As indicated in the table, refugees 
were also from Sudan, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, with 
smaller numbers from various African, Arab and Asian 
countries. 
As of February 2016, over 504,000 Palestine Refugees 
were registered by UNRWA in Lebanon.111 These 
included about 42,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria, 
the only migrants in that category of residents.112 
However, as the number of Palestinian refugees 
residing in the country in 2010 likely stood at around 
260,000-280,000,113 the total number of Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon in 2016 would, therefore, stand 
between 300,000 and 350,000. A survey conducted in 
2015114 showed that 63 percent of Palestinian Refugees 
from Lebanon (PRL) live in the twelve UNRWA-run 
refugee camps, compared to 54.8 percent of Palestinian 
Refugees from Syria (PRS), while the rest of the 
population lived in areas outside the camps. The largest 
concentration of PRL (52 percent of the total) was in 
South Lebanon, namely in Saida and Tyre, especially in 
Ein El Hilweh camp in Saida and in Rashidieh camp 
in Tyre, where respectively 15 and 12 percent of PRL 
were residing. The smallest share of PRL were in the 
Beqaa region (4 per cent). Fourteen percent of the PRS 
were also located in Ein El Hilweh and more generally 
in South Lebanon (53 percent of all PRS), and 14 
percent were housed in the Beqaa region. As for their 
demographics, the PRS population with a mean age 
of 25.6 years was five years younger, on average, than 
the PRL population. PRS households were also larger 
in size (5.6, members on average, as compared to 4.5 
household members for PRL). For the reasons indicated 
in the introduction, poverty prevailed among the two 
populations, with 9 per cent of the PRS “in extreme 
poverty” (3,500 were estimated to be unable to meet 
essential food requirements), while 89.1 percent were 
generally poor (35,000 could not meet their basic food 
and non-food needs). The PRL unemployment rate 
stood at 23 percent (a significant increase from the 2010 
rate of 8 percent); this rate was around 31 percent for 
women. The PRS unemployment rate, stood, instead, at 
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purposes. Those in refugee-like situations and family 
members made up a sizeable share of Lebanese 
nationals in Sweden: respectively, 21 and 69 percent 
of all permit-holders. Among Lebanese newcomers 
to these countries, family-related and humanitarian 
permits also stood out.91
In the UK, the predominance of the 25-44 years’ age 
group is noticeable; yet, most Lebanese there held 
education-related permits in 2015 (45 percent of all 
permits; 48 percent of new permits). This is consistent 
with the high level of education of Lebanese migrants in 
Britain (Figure 2).  
In Lebanon, as elsewhere, migration is a selective 
process: migrants are almost twice as educated as non-
migrants as indicated in Figure 2. Yet, the receiving 
countries’ policies and socio-economic setup also 
strongly select migrants. The UK’s and Canada’s points-
based immigration system mostly channel highly-
educated, post-graduate students and young highly-
skilled professionals to these countries, while France’s 
emphasis on student migration also channels highly-
educated migrants.92 In Australia, as well as in Sweden 
and Germany there are, meanwhile, more less educated 
family members and refugees. This is consistent with 
the profile of Lebanese migrants in these countries as 
described in the introduction. The low-educated and 
poor rural villagers who arrived in Australia in the 
early 1980s experienced difficulties with their socio-
cultural and professional insertion in the host country. 
Palestinians and migrants from South Lebanon who 
52.5 percent: 48.5 percent for men and 68.1 per cent for 
women. Around 80 per cent of employed PRL were self-
employed and wage labourers, while 53.4 percent of the 
employed PRS were paid on a daily basis, and held no 
employment contract.115
In 2015, a total of 209,674 labour permits were issued 
to foreign labourers by Lebanon’s Ministry of Labour; 
60,814 were first permits and 148,860 were renewals 
of permit. Added together,116 the figures indicate that 
the largest national group among legally-registered 
foreign workers were the Ethiopians who numbered 
73,419 (Figure 7); these are often females, employed 
in domestic services, like the Filipinas (23,606), the Sri 
Lankans (8,867), and Madagascan nationals. 
Bangladeshis were the second largest group among legal 
labourers with 49,136 nationals; field evidence suggests 
that these are mostly employed in construction, like 
Indian and Nepalese nationals. The agriculture and the 
hospitality sector are the other major employers of the 
foreign workforce, but the vast majority of permits were 
delivered for “female housekeeping” (75 percent) that 
year; 84 percent of permits pertained to housekeeping 
and cleaning activities alone.    
However, irregular employment is very common 
in Lebanon. The numerous Syrian and Palestinian 
labour force works mainly in the informal sector, as 
do the many Asian and African labourers. In the late 
2000s, the commonly accepted figure for the FDW 
was around 200,000,117 while the number of permits 
delivered for these activities was around 100,000 at 
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benefited from organised humanitarian migration 
channels to Germany and to northern European 
countries faced obstacles in accessing education and 
professional insertion into the host states. This explains 
the low level of education of Lebanese migrants in 
Northern European countries. As regards new migrants 
to these countries, migration networks and migration 
chains linking expatriate communities abroad with 
their region or village of origin in Lebanon may have 
later attracted less educated young migrants from 
these regions: these are regions which continue to be 
deprived. Meanwhile, migrants’ privileged access to 
nationality in Germany, noted earlier, may have been, 
above all, for Palestinian refugees, who were carrying 
UN travel documents.93 
As expected, most Lebanese migrants in France, the 
UK and Canada were in highly-skilled professions: 
the three top categories of professions (the “managers”, 
“professionals” and “technicians and associate 
professionals”) employ 69 percent of them in France; 
57 percent in the UK; and 53 percent in Canada. By 
contrast, 38 percent of employed Lebanese migrants in 
Australia;94 and 35 percent in Sweden were in the three 
lowest categories of occupations. Skilled professions, 
however, employed 36 percent of Lebanese migrants in 
Australia, and 24 percent of those residing in Sweden. 
There, another third worked in “services and trade”-
related professions.
Flows
The propensity to migrate is high in Lebanon: 36 
percent of young men and women there, aged 15 to 29, 
expressed their desire to emigrate in 2010.95 A third of 
young graduates wanted to leave their country in 2008.96
A survey conducted in 2009 by Lebanon’s Central 
Agency for Statistics97 indicated that, out of all emigrants 
recorded between 2004 and 2009, 21 percent had left the 
country in 2005 and 26 percent in 2007, following the 
war with Israel in 2006. In the 1990s, 15,000 to 20,000 
people emigrated every year, around the same number 
as there were net new entrants to the labour market.98 
Later, border crossing statistics reveal that following the 
Summer 2006 conflict, departures of Lebanese went up 
and largely outnumbered their returns. Yet, after 2010, 
and perhaps due, in part, to the long-lasting effect of the 
2008 financial crisis on Western and Gulf economies, 
departures (as well as returns) dropped significantly. 
the time. Registered female domestic workers (FDW) 
numbered 154,773 in 2015. If we consider that demand 
for such professionals has probably increased since 
the late 2000s, and if we assume a similar, high rate 
of irregularity among these workers in 2000 and in 
2015, there could be 300,000 female housekeepers in 
Lebanon. This is a very high number, for a total active 
population of 1.2 million (2011 data).118
Flows
Despite a brief stalling in 2006 and in 2012-2013, the 
total number of work permits given to foreign labourers 
in Lebanon119 almost trebled in fifteen years, from 
71,991 to 198,452 permits (Figure 8). 
The composition of the legal foreign labour force also 
changed slightly. Since the departure of Syrian troops 
from Lebanon in 2005, Arab workers became more 
numerous, especially Egyptians (who make up 80 
percent of Arab manpower at least during the period), 
and Sudanese nationals. The numbers of Palestinians 
and Syrians holding work permits are negligible. 
Most notable was the increase in the numbers of African 
labourers, from 14,000 in 2000 (20 percent of the legal 
labour force) to 85,000 in 2014 (43 percent of the legal 
labour force). In the mid-1990s, they numbered officially 
around 1,500 only (3 percent of the registered labour 
force). Ethiopian maids make up the clear majority of 
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Net migration flows also decreased, from -161,102 in 
2010 to -67,884 in 2011. Nonetheless, they remained 
strongly negative up until today.
This apparently contradicts statements pinpointing 
an upsurge in departures of Lebanese citizens 
since the beginning of the war in Syria in 2011 (see 
introduction). However, seen from the main receiving 
countries hosting Lebanese migrants, a significant 
increase in Lebanese inflows seem to have occurred, yet 
only in 2013-2014. Figure 4 shows that since 1990, the 
general trend of emigration to major OECD receiving 
countries (the USA, Germany, France, and Australia) 
has been stable, or even decreasing, with Canada the 
exception. Flows of Lebanese nationals to Saudi Arabia, 
by contrast, have consistently risen since the late 1990s. 
A setback can, however, be observed in 2011, before a 
new rise after that year. 
Does this indicate that Lebanese migrants started 
emigrating en masse to the Gulf, and less to other 
destinations during the 2000s? Data on inflows by 
nationality are unfortunately missing for the UAE, the 
other main receiver of Lebanese expatriates in the GCC 
region.
the African nationals employed in Lebanon: 73,000 
in 2015 as indicated earlier. However, the previously 
discussed prevalence of informal employment, and the 
onset of the Syrian conflict and the refugee inflows, 
has undermined this numeric dominance of African 
labourers on the Lebanese labour market.  
The outflow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon started 
after the onset of the war in March 2011 (Figure 
9). Refugees intended to stay close to their original 
locations in order to commute or to return easily. The 
free circulation between the two countries, the cross-
border networks based on family and community ties 
(the Druze for instance) intermarriage, and of course 
seasonal employment and business bonds initially 
provided income, as well as short-term accommodation 
and assistance.120  New arrivals during 2012, 2013 
and 2014 due to heavy fighting in the Damascus 
suburbs, in Homs and its region and in the Qalamoun 
mountains may explain the consistent increase in the 
numbers of registered refugees. However, the change 
in registrations (for instance the peak observed around 
March 2013) may also reflect the late registration of 
refugees already present in the country.121 The first 
informal limitations introduced after October 2014, i.e. 
limiting entries to Syrians deemed “urgent cases” was 
felt in the registration numbers as illustrated in Figure 
9. The total numbers of registrations stalled in the first 
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Field evidence confirms the growing attraction of the 
Gulf States to Lebanese nationals through the 2000s.99 
Yet, recent political developments in the region have 
had some repercussions on the flows of Lebanese to 
these countries. Seen from Saudi Arabia, the biggest 
receiver of Lebanese migrants (Figure 5), entries to 
and exits from Saudi Arabia effectively went up steadily 
between 1990 and 2011. 
months of 2015, after new visa rules restricting the 
entry of Syrians were implemented, which dropped the 
number of new refugee registration with UNHCR by 75 
percent. New registrations were totally interrupted after 
6 May 2015.
Do refugees had to leave Lebanon and go back to war-
torn Syria due to these new measures? To answer this 
question the trend in registrations with UNHCR was 
compared to the number of foreign births declared in 
Lebanon, of whom we assumed Syrian children made 
the largest share.122 After a relatively good correlation 
between the two number sets until the end of 2014, it 
was troubling to notice that foreign birth registration 
figures started collapsing after May 2015. This could 
suggest that, either refugees have returned to Syria, 
or that they have commuted, perhaps to give birth in 
the homeland, or that the registration of Syrian births 
ended in 2015.
Their going back to Syria in large numbers is unlikely, as 
regions neighbouring Lebanon are not safe, especially 
for expectant mothers. Moreover, the dire conditions 
endured by many Syrians in Lebanon signal the 
impossibility of returning. Moving to a third country 
(for instance going to Europe through Turkey), was 
envisaged by many during the large waves of emigration 
to Europe in 2015; however, it remained unaffordable for 
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Net flows sky-rocketed in the 1990s, in spite of the 
Saudi and other Gulf economies’ contraction during 
the period, following the First Gulf War and a fall in 
oil prices. The economic and socio-political context in 
Lebanon,100 was indeed pushing Lebanese labourers out 
while preventing “older” expatriates from returning to 
Lebanon. Net flows started decreasing in the mid-2000s, 
while inflows and outflows continued rising: this may 
indicate a growing circularity of migration movements 
between Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and other countries. 
The negative net migration for 2008 may, meanwhile, 
be a consequence of the economic crisis.101 
Yet, the brutal fall in the in- and outflows recorded in 
2011 are striking. As are the negative net migration to 
the country (more Lebanese leaving than entering Saudi 
Arabia) in 2013.102 These might suggest a disruption in 
Lebanese patterns of migration to the Gulf. Lebanese 
migrants are mostly skilled and highly-skilled; it is thus 
unlikely that they left because of the massive crackdown 
campaigns conducted that year by the Saudi authorities 
against foreigners in an irregular situation. However, it 
is possible that some Lebanese nationals there had, first, 
repatriated their families, and explored new business 
opportunities in more politically-stable environments 
like Western countries. Yet, some categories of Lebanese 
nationals have been targeted by security crackdowns 
in some Gulf States since the late 2000s, and the UAE 
carried out deportations of Lebanese Shiites in 2015, 
as indicated in the introductory section. No such 
selective deportation was publicised in Saudi Arabia, 
but numbers show that some Lebanese have been 
effectively sent back, and/or prevented from migrating 
to Saudi Arabia since 2011.
Patterns of Lebanese migration to the Gulf may thus 
have shifted since the end of the 2000s. This is the 
result of the economic uncertainties ongoing since 
the 2008 financial crisis and more recently, the drop 
in oil prices, which led to the contractions in public 
expenditure and in subcontracting (in construction, 
infrastructural projects especially), coupled with the 
constraints in employment posed by the numerous 
labour reforms (the new policies of Saudisation of 
the workforce especially). Another important factor 
are the political tensions between Lebanon and the 
Gulf States, especially following the Arab uprisings. 
This may explain the very recent upsurge (post-2013) 
which can be observed in Lebanese migration to the 
US, to Canada and to Germany, visible on Figure 4. In 
most.123 Moreover, refugees in countries neighbouring 
Syria either do not always possess the necessary 
resources for long-term international migration and 
a radical overhaul of their lifestyle,124 or they do not 
want to resettle outside the region; Syrian migrants to 
Europe, in any case, were mostly first-time migrants.125
Therefore, the fall in the number of foreign births 
after January 2015 is probably due to a delaying of the 
registration of the new-borns. Already before that date, 
UNHCR estimated that 70 percent of the 42,000 refugee 
children born in Lebanon since the start of the Syrian 
conflict in March 2011 did not have birth certificates. 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon can register the newly-
born at their embassy in Beirut, but many fear doing so 
because they are from opposition areas or because they 
have fled military service or arrest. The children can 
also be registered with the Lebanese authorities. But 
the process is administratively complex and requires 
documents that not all parents could gather as they often 
had to flee their homes very quickly.126 Since the new 
residency rules were implemented in January 2015, the 
vast majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has fallen 
into irregularity. Although, in theory, expired residency 
documents should not be an obstacle for parents in 
declaring their children, aid agencies report that lack 
of reliable information and inconsistency in applying 
rules on the part of the Lebanese authorities mean that 
in practice, this rarely happens.127 Irregular Syrians fear 
arrest, or even being deported, by the Lebanese security 
forces if they approach Lebanese administrative units to 
declare their child’s birth. Several tens of thousands of 
Syrian children have thus been born stateless.128 
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Germany, for instance, net migration figures shot up in 
2014 with 3,067 migrants from Lebanon, up from 263 
in 2010. Although no data is available to confirm the 
hypothesis, one could imagine that these are migrants 
from South-Lebanon, who faced difficulties accessing 
Gulf markets. They hence reactivated older networks in 
order to reach Germany. 
Meanwhile, the flow of remittances sent back by 
expatriates continued to rise, after a brief stall in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis between 2009 and 2012 
(Figure 6). This confirms the sustainability of migration 
flows from Lebanon. Remittances constituted about 
16 percent of the country’s GDP in 2015, down from 
about 25 percent in 2008.103 Against the backdrop of 
increasing remittances, this drop in their relative share 
of the GDP could be due to fluctuations in Lebanon’s 
GDP over the same period. Notwithstanding the fact 
that they are private assets, expatriates’ remittances still 
play a major role in supporting household income and 
the Lebanese economy, more generally.
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